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The Petroleum Driver Passport Scheme: A Case Study in Reregulation 
Edmund Heery, Leon Gooberman, Marco Hauptmeier 
 
Introduction 
The deregulation of the labour market has been a core element of the Washington Consensus, the 
neo-liberal framework that has dominated Western public policy for three decades. Deregulation 
has encompassed the weakening or withdrawal of substantive employment rules, designed to 
shelter workers from market forces or establish minimum standards. It has also embraced 
procedural reform, restricting the opportunities for workers to seek legal redress for grievances or 
organize and bargain through trade unions. Finally, it has involved decentralization of labour market 
decision-making, typically through the break-up of industrywide collective bargaining and the 
abandoning of employment regulation that establishes common standards across multiple 
employers. Reform of the labour market in accordance with these principles has been a marked 
feature of the recent Coalition and Conservative administrations of the United Kingdom (Williams 
and Scott 2016) and, in the period since the global financial crisis, has also been characteristic of 
several continental European countries (Marginson 2015; Meardi 2014). The appetite for 
deregulation amongst many policy makers remains unabated. For proponents, reform of this kind 
improves the functioning of the labour market and so operates to the long-term benefit of both 
buyers and sellers of labour. Privileged insiders, such as those organized in trade unions which 
monopolize labour supply, may lose access to economic rents as market-restricting regulation is 
abolished but the package of reform is believed to serve all legitimate labour market interests. 
 While the deregulationist programme remains highly influential, it has increasingly been 
subject to critique by those who question whether its effects are universally beneficial. One line of 
critique claims that deregulation encourages a low-skill/low-productivity dynamic within the 
economy and so operates against the long-term interests of capital itself. The claim here is that 
deregulation encourages a form of economic development that is excessively reliant on cost 
reduction and which is not sustainable over the longer term (Rubery et al. 2016). A second argument 
points to the high social cost associated with rising income inequality, which itself is regarded as the 
unavoidable consequence of a deregulated labour market. According to this line of argument the 
eŵeƌgeŶĐe of a ͚pƌeĐaƌiat͛, a suďstaŶtial group of low-wage, insecure workers, threatens social 
integration and facilitates political volatility, seen in the rise of populist political movements 
(Standing 2011). A third argument claims essentially that while business may gain from deregulation, 
at least in the shorter term, there are serious adverse consequences for labour seen in the erosion of 
eŵploǇŵeŶt staŶdaƌds aŶd a ͚ƌaĐe to the ďottoŵ͛ iŶ staŶdaƌds of ŵaŶageŵeŶt practice. The 
suggestion here is that deregulation is zero-sum in its effects, shifting the balance of economic 
returns from labour to capital and transferring risk from employers to workers (Hacker 2008; Kochan 
and Riordan 2016). Wage stagnation, insecure work and diminished welfare support, according to 
this view, are the price that workers pay for deregulation. 
 Growing awareness of the potential downside to deregulation has prompted the emergence 
of counterproposals. The need to reregulate the labour market has emerged as a theme in public 
policy. Advocates of reregulation have tended to call for new institutions of labour market 
governance that operate above the level of the employing enterprise, and which can afford fresh 
protection to workers and re-establish good labour market standards within industry or occupational 
labour markets. The purpose of this article is to present a case study of a successful initiative of this 
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kind, the Petroleum Driver Passport scheme. The latter is a new form of industry-level regulation 
that opeƌates iŶ the UK͛s doǁŶstƌeaŵ oil-distribution industry and which stipulates and enforces 
safe working practices in the transport of petroleum-related products. Under the scheme, petroleum 
tanker drivers can only collect fuel from refineries and distribution centres if they possess a 
passport, which vouches for their safety competence. The scheme is backed by trade unions, the oil 
majors, logistics companies and other stakeholders within the industry and represents a concerted, 
industrywide attempt to address mounting concern about safety standards in a fragmented and 
competitive sector. In what follows, we present an account of the scheme, identify the multiple 
factors that caused it to be created, evaluate its success, and offer reflections on the lessons that it 
holds for the wider theme of reregulation. Before presenting the case, however, we first examine 
the literature on reregulation, identifying core prescriptions and reviewing key pieces of research. 
Reregulation 
Just as the deregulation of the labour market can assume a number of forms, so might its 
reregulation. Inter alia, it can encompass the enactment of new or the strengthening of existing legal 
protection for employees, the strengthening of enforcement mechanisms through which such 
protection is given effect and the bolstering of the capacity of trade unions to organize workers and 
engage in collective bargaining with employers (Dickens and Hall 2003). It can also encompass 
centralization and the creation of new regulatory institutions that operate at a multi-employer level 
and whose rationale is to formulate substantive rules that apply across a given industry, 
occupational or regional labour market. The Petroleum Driver Passport scheme is an example of 
multi-employer regulation of this type. It is not unique in this regard and a feature of both 
prescriptive and research literature in recent years has been a fresh attention to multi-employer 
regulation and how it can be re-established to counter the adverse features of deregulated labour 
markets. In what follows, we consider two cases of this kind which can serve as a comparative 
reference for our case study of the Petroleum Driver scheme, allowing us to identify the distinctive 
features of the latter as an episode of reregulation. 
 The first case can be found in the US literature on union revitalization and concerns the 
creation of state-wide systems of collective bargaining for care assistants providing domiciliary care. 
The latter comprise a large and growing segment of the working population, are primarily female 
and frequently of ethnic minority status and are involved in low-wage work that often is insecure, 
unsafe and lacking in the provision of protective benefits. They are also a highly fragmented group of 
workers, divided between multiple employers and with many working as independent contractors 
who are hired directly by the individuals to whom they provide care (Stacey 2011). The unionization 
of this group of workers in states such as California, Oregon and Ohio, and has been one of the signal 
successes of the American labour movement in recent years (Boris and Klein 2007; Cobble and 
Merrill 2009; Delp and Quan 2002; Mareschal 2006, 2007). It has relied upon classic organizing 
practice, such as face-to-face recruitment, house-calling, and the identification and development of 
leaders from amongst the social care workforce. The intrinsic difficulty of organizing a dispersed and 
fragmented workforce, however, means that use has been made of other resources. State-level 
campaigns have made use of union-community alliances, with organizations of service users joining 
unions in campaigning for improved employment standards from a belief that this will 
simultaneously raise service standards. The campaigns have also typically had a strong political 
dimension, targeting state and city legislatures for action to improve pay and working conditions for 
the social care workforce. Political support has been an essential condition for the main institutional 
innovation that has emerged from the campaigns: the creation of a public authority that acts as a 
collective representative of multiple employers and negotiates collective agreements with the 
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unions representing care workers. The collective agreements that have resulted from this process 
have raised pay and established portable security benefits for the workforce and include provisions 
for training, registration and the accreditation of home care aides. Research indicates that they have 
been effective in reducing turnover and in so doing have probably enhanced the quality of care 
provided. Social care remains a poorly paid and insecure occupation in the USA but the union-
organizing drive has resulted in appreciable benefits for workers and the provision of a public good, 
a more stable and better qualified workforce. 
 The second case can be found in the growing literature on employment relations within 
extended supply chains. A focus of this literature has been the growth of attempts to regulate 
employment conditions within supply chains to counter the erosive effect of outsourcing on labour 
standards. In some cases regulation has taken the form of a code of conduct developed by a 
multinational enterprise at the apex of a supply chain which seeks to raise employment standards 
within supplier businesses, while in others multiple stakeholders, comprising leading brands and 
retailers, unions, NGOs and government agencies, formulate standards that they seek to have 
applied and enforced through public inspection and audit (Wright and Kaine 2015). Much of the 
literature on the regulation of employment conditions within supply chains is concerned with 
international business and the application of codes originating in the Global North to contractors in 
the Global South (e.g. Locke 2013). There is a growing policy and research interest, however, in the 
regulation of supply chains within developed economies and it is to this current that the second case 
belongs. 
 The case deals with the response of Unite to the decline of pay and labour standards in the 
UK͛s ŵeat pƌoĐessiŶg iŶdustƌǇ, ǁheƌe iŶteŶse Đost pƌessuƌe applied ďǇ ƌetaileƌs at the top of the 
supply chain had led to the growing employment of migrant workers on agency contracts with lower 
rates of pay than the direct workforce (Wright 2016; Wright and Brown 2013). Unite initially tried to 
deal with these problems through organizing agency workers and instituting a form of pattern 
bargaining amongst meat processing companies. The failure of these classic union methods, 
however, led Unite to change tack and target the retail chains, seeking to enlist their support for 
initiatives to improve pay and labour standards within their suppliers. Unite directed this effort 
through the Ethical Trading Initiative, to which most leading retailers belong, and exerted additional 
pressure by successfully requesting the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) investigate 
racial discrimination within the employment practices of the meat processing sector. The ensuing 
report received extensive press coverage, which was highly critical of the major retailers. These 
initiatives met with partial success. Marks and Spencer agreed to establish two model factories in 
partnership with supplier businesses, while supermarket chain, ASDA, negotiated a framework 
agreement with Unite which guaranteed pay parity to agency workers from day one and transition 
to permanent employment after three months and formulated a set of employment standards with 
which all of its 29 meat suppliers had to comply or lose contracts. These reforms covered only a 
fraction of the industry but nevertheless led to tangible benefits including increases in pay, improved 
job security and the elimination of the worst forms of labour abuse in conforming factories. 
 The American developments in social Đaƌe aŶd the UK eǆpeƌiŵeŶt iŶ ͚soĐiallǇ sustaiŶaďle 
souƌĐiŶg͛ aƌe Ŷot the oŶlǇ Đases of ƌeƌegulatioŶ thƌough ŵulti-employer arrangements that have 
been reported. The arrangements in social care have clear parallels with the well-known Justice for 
Janitors campaign in the USA (Milkman 2006) and in Ireland a union campaign has led to the 
extension of public sector terms and conditions to domiciliary care workers employed by voluntary 
organizations that receive state funding (Murphy and Turner 2014). In the UK, other studies attest to 
the role of unions and lead firms in promoting good health and safety practice amongst 
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subcontractors in both construction and the maritime industry (James et al. 2015; Wright and Brown 
2013). Moreover, proposals to revive multi-employer collective bargaining have gained currency in 
recent years and won support from both the TUC and the Labour Party. In a Manifesto for Labour 
Law, leading employment lawyers have proposed that Sectoral Employment Commissions be 
established by statute across all UK industries and charged with negotiating Sectoral Collective 
Agreements. The latter would establish industry-minimum employment conditions and have specific 
responsibilities for promoting equal pay, health and safety, industrywide pensions, and training and 
apprenticeships. Significantly, Sectoral Collective Agreements would apply to public sector 
contractors and to all agency workers operating within an industry (Ewing et al. 2016). 
 The cases that we have reviewed are of interest, we believe, because they exemplify 
broader themes within this reregulation literature. First, the labour problems identified in the cases 
are attributed to deregulation and associated forces, including union decline, the break-up of multi-
employer bargaining, the weakening of employment protection, anti-union law, privatization and 
outsourcing. Second, the problems themselves are centred on low pay but also embrace poor 
working and health and safety conditions, worker insecurity, low productivity and low skills. Third, 
the primary agent promoting reregulation are trade unions. These are trade unions in straitened 
circumstances, however, which must supplement traditional forms of collective action with alliances 
with consumers, human rights campaigners, advocates of corporate social responsibility, and state 
agencies. The Đase foƌ ƌeƌegulatioŶ teŶds to ďe allied to the Đase foƌ a ͚Ŷeǁ uŶioŶisŵ͛ to fit the 
altered circumstances of deregulated, insecure labour markets (Milkman 2013). Fourth, while 
reregulation has often assumed a voluntarist form, inscribed in framework agreements and codes of 
practice, its emergence has depended upon state support, seen in the creation of public authorities 
to negotiate agreements in US social care and the part played by the EHRC in UK meat-processing. 
Fifth, and pivotally, reregulation has taken the form of new institutions that recentralize regulation 
and which cover multiple employers. The public authorities and state-level collective agreements in 
the American case and the framework agreements with lead firms, which apply to subcontractors in 
the British case, both assume this form. Finally, the substantive regulation that issues from these 
new institutions addresses the multiple problems found within deregulated labour markets. Raising 
low wages is a central concern but so is addressing worker insecurity through portable benefits and 
temp-to-perm clauses. The questions of poor workforce treatment and health safety are also 
addressed as are improvements in training and attempts to upgrade HR practice in order to support 
improved business performance. Reregulation in these cases, it is suggested, generates public goods 
that serve the interests of multiple stakeholders. 
Research 
The case of the Petroleum Driver Passport was encountered serendipitously while carrying out a 
laƌgeƌ studǇ of the ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ ƌole of eŵploǇeƌs͛ oƌgaŶizatioŶs. In the context of this wider 
research, a major finding of which was the continuing withdrawal of traditional eŵploǇeƌs͛ 
organizations from collective regulation (Reference concealed), we were immediately struck by the 
counter-trend quality of the scheme. The latter was a deliberate attempt to recreate multi-employer 
ƌegulatioŶ iŶ the UK͛s osteŶsiďlǇ flexible labour market. The scheme was of interest, in the first place 
therefore, because of its idiosyncrasy and the fact that it was not representative of dominant trends 
within UK industrial relations.  
The scheme was also of interest, however, because it was representative in a different 
sense. It embodied a particular type of prescription for the reregulation of labour markets, which 
focuses on the creation of new labour market institutions that operate at the multi-employer level. 
In this regard, the Petroleum Driver Passport ĐaŶ fuŶĐtioŶ as a ͚lead͛ oƌ ͚pƌe-figuƌatiǀe͛ Đase, 
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furnishing lessons about the conditions under which reregulation can occur, which has relevance 
beyond oil distribution. The case of the Petroleum Driver Passport is an idiosyncratic development in 
UK industrial relations, therefore, but should be of interest to those who wish to reform the labour 
market and who are sceptical about the value of the dominant deregulatory thrust of public policy. 
 The research itself pursued two courses. Along the first, semi-structured interviews were 
held in 2015-16 with representatives of the multiple institutions involved in developing and 
implementing the Passport. The purpose was to obtain the differing perspectives of the stakeholders 
in the scheme – trade unions, employers, business organizations and government – while also using 
the interviews as a reliability check, developing an account of the scheme that drew upon a variety 
of sources. Those involved in the Passport were extremely cooperative and with a couple of 
eǆĐeptioŶs, it ǁas possiďle to iŶteƌǀieǁ all of the ŵaiŶ paƌtiĐipaŶts iŶ the sĐheŵe͛s deǀelopŵeŶt aŶd 
implementation. Table 1 lists the organizations from which interviewees came and gives the number 
of interviewees per organization. In all but two cases interviews were recorded and transcribed and 
were analysed to identify key developments, events and themes. In the cases where it was not 
possible to record the interview an account was written down shortly after the interview was 
completed. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 The second line of research involved the collection of documents on the Passport scheme 
that described its origin, form and effects. These documents included: 1) the report of ACAS into the 
industrial dispute between Unite and the oil distribution companies that prompted the development 
of the Passport; 2) ministerial correspondence on the setting up of a multi-stakeholder body to 
review health and safety in the industry and formulate proposals for its regulation; 3) the 
constitution of the Downstream Oil-industry Distribution Forum (DODF), the body which oversees 
the Passport; 4) accounts of the scheme and of the training and accreditation regime that supports it 
produced by Unite and by Cogent Skills, the industry training body; and 5) statistical data describing 
the diffusion of the scheme following its launch in 2014. The Petroleum Driver Passport added a new 
layer of formal regulation to the oil distribution industry and in so doing generated rich documentary 
material that provided information in its own right but which also allowed for the triangulation of 
evidence from interviews.  
To summarise, the research into the Petroleum Driver Passport was a case study of an 
industry-specific and in certain respects idiosyncratic institutional development. While confined to a 
single industry, however, the case has relevance for the broader debate about labour market 
reregulation. It followed a mixed-method design (Bergman 2008), comprising interviewing and 
documentary analysis, in order to obtain multiple perspectives on the Passport and generate a full 
and rounded description of the scheme. The twin-track research, we feel, also enhanced the 
reliability of the study, allowing sources to be checked against one another to provide a robust 
account of the Passport. 
Downstream Oil Distribution 
The downstream oil industry in the UK comprises the refining and storage of oil products and their 
marketing and distribution. Petroleum tanker drivers, of whom there are approximately 8,500, are a 
core group within the workforce of the industry, collecting oil from refineries and storage facilities 
and transporting it by road to supermarket forecourts and other end-users. In certain respects, this 
workforce is unlike those identified in other case studies of reregulation. Tanker drivers are a 
relatively well-paid group, earning more than most other manual occupations and other road 
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haulage workers. It is a male-dominated occupation, with a predominantly white and relatively old 
workforce, features that it shares with the wider road haulage sector (House of Commons Select 
Committee on Transport 2016). It is also a workforce with a long-history of trade union organization 
(Smith 2001). 
 Other features of the industry, however, do correspond to those found in the other studies 
described above. In the past, oil distribution was vertically integrated with the major oil companies 
operating refineries, tanker-fleets and petrol stations. Today, this pattern has almost completely 
disintegrated. Refined petroleum is often stored by specialist tank storage operators, is distributed 
by hauliers, such as Wincanton, Stobart, Hoyer and Certas Energy, and is sold through supermarket 
outlets. For haulage companies, contracts to supply the main supermarket chains are core business 
and there is intense competition to win contracts of this kind, a by-product of which is that tanker 
drivers may be transferred to a new employer when supply-contracts are won and lost. Oil 
distribution is now a vertically fragmented industry, therefore, characterized by the operation of 
supply chains in the same manner as meat processing and construction. 
 Another feature of oil distribution that it shares with other cases is the erosion of joint 
regulation. Multi-employer bargaining was never a feature of oil distribution and deregulation has 
not taken the form of a collapse of industrywide arrangements. Rather there has been an erosion of 
bargaining per se, partly through employers derecognizing unions and partly through the entry of 
non-union operators, such as Stobart (Smith 2001). Other developments, such as increased use of 
agency labour, have also served to erode the union position. 
 These long-term structural and regulatory changes in the industry were increasingly seen by 
Unite as posing a threat both to its own institutional position within oil distribution and to the 
substantive employment conditions of its tanker-driver members. In response, in the late 2000s, the 
union launched a campaign, Enough is Enough, which focused on three demands: a minimum wage 
for the industry, an industrywide occupational pension scheme, and a legally-enforceable code of 
health and safety practice. All three issues, it was argued by the union, were necessary because of 
the entry of low-cost operators who were undermining terms and conditions and which reduced 
costs by failing to offer security benefits and cutting corners on safety training and practice. A Unite 
national officer characterised the motivation behind the campaign as follows:  
At oŶe poiŶt theǇ [taŶkeƌ dƌiǀeƌs] ǁouldŶ͛t haǀe talked aďout a ŵiŶiŵuŵ staŶdaƌd ďeĐause 
it all would be about improvements and collective bargaining to improve, but I think 
increasingly people want those minimum standards and stakes in the ground because they 
see how low things can go without them. Deregulation and privatization and all these other 
things have shoǁŶ that if it͛s oŶlǇ aďout suƌǀiǀal of the fittest iŶ teƌŵs of the Đheapest aŶd 
the one with least standards, then we have to have some totally agreed standards.  
The pensions issue was additionally a product of the fragmentation of the industry and the transfer 
of drivers initially from the oil companies to hauliers and then from haulier to haulier as a result of 
the tendering process. Because of this process many drivers were members of multiple pension 
schemes and the demand was for rationalization through the merging of company schemes into a 
single, industrywide pension.  
The union campaign ran for two years, attempted to raise public awareness through media 
coverage and a dedicated website, and was accompanied by a recruitment drive and a road show 
with regional meetings designed to explain the issues and win support amongst the tanker-driver 
workforce. AŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt featuƌe of the ĐaŵpaigŶ ǁas that it ǁas fƌaŵed iŶ teƌŵs of ͞ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ 
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safetǇ͟, aƌouŶd a Đlaiŵ that a ͞ƌaĐe to the ďottoŵ͟ iŶ eŵploǇŵeŶt terms was endangering the 
public through the unsafe transport of fuel. The main objective of the campaign was to secure an 
industry agreement on the three issues with the main haulage companies and while joint meetings 
were held no agreement was concluded. This failure led the union to organize a successful ballot for 
strike action, which prompted collective conciliation by ACAS in early 2012. The dispute was resolved 
ǁithout a stƌike takiŶg plaĐe as a ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe of ACA“͛s iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ, ǁhiĐh led to the 
establishment of three joint union-employer working parties to examine the calls for a minimum 
wage, industrywide pension and a code for safe working practice.  
Least progress was made on the question of an industrywide pension. It was accepted by all 
within the working group that a scheme of this kind was desirable but the technical difficulties in 
merging existing schemes into a new scheme proved insuperable and the attempt was abandoned. 
To date, the industry continues to lack a portable, occupational pension. The attempt to establish an 
industry minimum rate of pay was also abandoned though in this case it was accepted by those 
reviewing the issue that a minimum rate may not in fact be desirable and could rebound against the 
workforce. The fear was that supermarket chains negotiating supply contracts with hauliers would 
seek a price based on or slightly above the industry minimum, thereby exerting a downward 
pressure on wage rates. As a consequence, a different course was adopted. Pay consultants, Incomes 
Data Research, were commissioned to carry out a pay and benefits survey of the oil distribution 
sector to identify the range of experience and facilitate the diffusion of good practice from one firm 
to another. The strategy switched therefore from seeking to apply a minimum rate to providing the 
resources for greater coordination of company-level bargaining. (Sisson and Marginson 2002). The 
most successful of the three working groups was that dealing with health and safety and the need 
for a new code of practice. It was from the deliberation of this third group that the Petroleum Driver 
Passport was born. 
The Petroleum Driver Passport 
The central recommendation of the working party on safety was that the Downstream Oil-industry 
Distribution Forum (DODF) should be reconvened with a brief to review safety in the transport of oil 
and formulate recommendations for the development of a safety passport for tanker drivers. The 
DODF had originally been established in the early 2000s, following a previous union campaign, to 
consider safety issues in the industry but had fallen into disuse. At the request of ACAS and the 
paƌties to the dispute, Ed DaǀeǇ, the CoalitioŶ͛s eŶeƌgǇ ŵiŶisteƌ, asked foƌ the DODF to ďe ƌe-
estaďlished, ͚to faĐilitate a ƌeǀieǁ of ďest pƌaĐtiĐe iŶ health and safety and driver training standards 
with the aim of incorporating this into a new industry-ǁide Code of PƌaĐtiĐe͛. 
 IŶ the ǁake of the MiŶisteƌ͛s Đall, the DODF ǁas ƌeĐoŶǀeŶed ǁith a fƌesh ŵeŵďeƌship aŶd 
constitution in 2012. The essential feature of the DODF is that it was a multi-stakeholder body that 
sought to involve all of the main interests in the industry in the attempt to develop the new safety 
code. The membership of the DODF ǁas dƌaǁŶ fƌoŵ the iŶdustƌǇ͛s uŶioŶs ;UŶite, U‘TUͿ, the ŵaiŶ 
haulage companies, sector skills bodies (Cogent Skills and Skills for Logistics), representatives from 
the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and the Department for Transport (DoT), and 
the main trade associations for the industry. The latter comprised: United Kingdom Petroleum 
Industry Association (UKPIA), Downstream Fuel Association (DFA), Federation of Petroleum Suppliers 
(FPS), Freight Transport Association (FTA). Road Haulage Association (RHA) and Petrol Retailers 
Association (PRA). It was also agreed that the Health and Safety Executive would provide expert 
support to DODF. While the list of organizations represented in the DODF was extensive, it did not 
include the main supermarket chains (PRA is the trade association for independent petrol retailers). 
Perhaps the key participants among the trade associations who were included were UKPIA, 
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representing the oil majors and TSA, representing businesses that provide ͞liquid warehousing͟, 
storing refined fuel. The membership of these two associations play the key role in enforcing the 
Passport and a notable feature of the development of the scheme was that it rested on businesses 
at the base of the supply chain rather than being driven by retail brands at its apex. 
 A second important feature of the DODF was that it was not a negotiating body, engaged in 
joint regulation. The unions and the direct employers of the members, the haulage companies, 
occupied a central position in the Forum but they sat alongside other interests, most of which did 
not have a direct relationship with Unite or URTU outside of the Forum. Moreover, the terms of 
ƌefeƌeŶĐe foƌ the DODF stated eǆpliĐitlǇ that it ǁould ͚opeƌate ďǇ ĐoŶseŶsus, Ŷot ďǇ ǀotiŶg͛. The 
assumption underpinning the creation of the Forum, therefore, was that questions of safety and of 
related training were issues of shared interest across the multiple groups and agencies that comprise 
the industry, an assumption that most who were interviewed reported had been reflected in 
behaviour: 
[E]ǀeƌǇthiŶg that I͛ǀe seeŶ…has ďeeŶ eǆtƌeŵelǇ Đollaďoƌatiǀe aŶd has seeŶ stƌoŶg 
eŶgageŵeŶt fƌoŵ the iŶdustƌǇ people…“o aĐtuallǇ I do thiŶk theǇ shaƌe kiŶd of a ĐoŵŵoŶ 
oďjeĐtiǀe iŶ deǀelopiŶg it aŶd I doŶ͛t thiŶk theǇ see it as iŶ aŶǇoŶe͛s iŶteƌest foƌ theƌe to ďe 
poor standards of training. It could only be a good thing (Civil servant). 
The task of the Forum was to produce regulation but to do this through an integrative, not 
distributive process with a consensual decision as the end product. 
 To discharge its new responsibility, the DODF established a PDP Management Group from 
amongst its members to develop, launch, support and review the Passport scheme. Expert and 
administrative support to this group was provided by Cogent Skills, the skills body for science-based 
industries. It was the PDP Management Group which developed the Passport over the course of 
2012-13, allowing the scheme to be launched in January 2014. The scheme that was developed by 
the Management Group has the following features:- 
 The scope of the scheme embraces all drivers of road tankers engaged in the transport of 
͚fiŶished petƌoleuŵ pƌoduĐts͛ to eŶd-users, such as petrol retailers, business users of liquid fuel 
and domestic customers. All of the products covered by the scheme are classed as hazardous 
substances;  At the heart of the scheme is an Industry Training Standard, which specifies levels of 
competence that are required to obtain the Passport in preparing, loading, driving, offloading 
and delivering petroleum products by road tanker. Each of these five main competences are 
ďƌokeŶ doǁŶ iŶto lists of ͚staŶdaƌds of peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe͛ aŶd ͚uŶdeƌpiŶŶiŶg kŶoǁledge aŶd 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͛, iŶĐludiŶg speĐifiĐ ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts foƌ paƌtiĐulaƌ segŵeŶts of the iŶdustƌǇ such as 
retail, aviation, commercial and domestic heating;  Assessment of competence includes formal assessment through a written, multiple-choice 
examination and a practical assessment, which focuses on loading, driving and offloading. It is 
necessary for drivers to pass both elements to be issued with the Passport;  The Passport itself is valid for five years but to maintain validation it is necessary for drivers to 
undergo annual refreshment training, including a practical assessment. The aim is to maintain 
skills and to update them in line with developments in the industry;  Training and assessment is conducted by accredited Training Providers, which include several of 
the leading haulage firms, FPS, and independent training businesses. Training providers need to 
demonstrate that they have instructors and assessors in place who have appropriate skills and 
qualifications, including relevant industry experience; 
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 The scheme is managed under contract by the Scottish Qualifications Authority (SQA), which has 
responsibility for accrediting and monitoring Training Providers and issuing Passports to drivers. 
SQA employs a team of External Verifiers who monitor the performance of Training Providers. 
In addition to its substantive content, the Passport possesses a number of other 
distinguishing features. First, it is a voluntary scheme, an example of the private regulation of the 
labour market in the manner of corporate codes of conduct that apply within international supply 
chains or the framework agreement in meat processing desĐƌiďed aďoǀe. UŶite͛s iŶitial oďjeĐtiǀe ǁas 
to secure a statutory code but it relinquished this position in the conciliation process. Partly this was 
because securing a statutory code would prove difficult: the Coalition Government had launched its 
Red Tape Challenge to ƌeduĐe the ƌegulatoƌǇ ͚ďuƌdeŶ͛ oŶ ďusiŶess aŶd ǁould Ŷot ĐouŶteŶaŶĐe 
further statutory regulation of driver safety (James 2016). Partly too, it was because there were 
perceived benefits in voluntary regulation. If the industry was responsible for developing and 
opeƌatiŶg its oǁŶ Đode theŶ ͚ďuǇ-iŶ͛ ǁould ďe gƌeateƌ aŶd ƌegulatioŶ ǁould possess ŵoƌe 
legitimacy. It was also suggested that a voluntary code could be more rapidly developed, focus on 
desirable rather than minimal standards and be tailored to the particular requirements of the 
industry. In the eyes of industry paƌtiĐipaŶts the Passpoƌt possessed the ďeŶefits of ͚ƌefleǆiǀe 
ƌegulatioŶ͛ (Hepple 2012). 
 The weakness of voluntary regulation is that it can prove ineffective because it generally 
lacks means of enforcement (Deakin et al. 2012). However, a second distinguishing feature of the 
Passport is that the method of enforcing the scheme is relatively robust, especially when compared 
with the consumer marks or light auditing practices that support other voluntary standards. Drivers 
cannot enter refineries or fuel storage depots to collect fuel unless they have the Passport and the 
oil majors and companies operating tank storage facilities have accepted the responsibility for 
ensuring this provision is enforced. There are six refineries in the UK and about 70 oil terminals from 
which the vast majority of refined fuel is distributed. Enforcement is concentrated at relatively few 
points within the distribution network, therefore, with the result that any haulage company wishing 
to gain access to the network has to ensure that its drivers have the Passport:  
Now with the PDP scheme, there are a limited number of fuel distribution terminals and that 
means that if you can get that limited number of fuel distribution terminals to insist that any 
driver loading fuel on their site has to have a valid PDP, then you are effectively enforcing 
the PDP sĐheŵe eǀeŶ though Ǉou doŶ͛t Ŷeed to ďǇ laǁ ;DODF ‘epƌeseŶtatiǀeͿ. 
It caŶ fuƌtheƌ ďe Ŷoted that the ƌesouƌĐe upoŶ ǁhiĐh eŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt ƌelies is the ͚positioŶal poǁeƌ͛ of 
the oil companies and tank storage operators at the base of the supply chain and not the 
monopsonistic power of retailers at the top of the chain. Moreover, the use of the power of oil 
companies to establish effective voluntary regulation is not solely a feature of the downstream oil 
industry. It can also be seen upstream in the international oil trade where the oil majors enforce a 
very tight code of safety practice on the operators of marine oil tankers (Walters and Bailey 2013). 
The oil companies are businesses with a long record of intervening in and organizing their own 
supply chains. 
 A third feature of the scheme was that it was designed explicitly to fit with existing 
regulatory arrangements that applied within the industry. Voluntary regulation often complements 
and can amplify the effects of statutory regulation (James et al. 2015) and this kind of interaction 
between different regulatory forms was also seen in the case of the Passport. One statutory 
provision that covers the downstream oil industry is the ADR Dangerous Goods Driver Training 
Qualification, a certificate of competence that all drivers involved in the transport of hazardous 
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materials must acquire. The Industry Training Standard for the Passport has been written to 
complement the ADR, such that training and tests of competence focus on the specific features of oil 
transportation and do not seek to reproduce more general requirements. Another provision is the 
Driver Certificate of Professional Competence (CPC), which derives from a European regulation 
designed to improve road safety and which is compulsory for drivers of all commercial vehicles of 3.5 
tonnes gross weight. CPC requires that drivers undergo periodic retraining and it has been agreed by 
regulatory authorities that the annual reassessment for the Passport can count for this purpose. This 
is an important concession because it reduces the amount of time drivers are absent from work 
being trained and so diminishes costs. The integration with CPC was vital in securing the support of 
haulage companies for the Passport.  A final piece of complementary regulation is the voluntary Safe 
Loading Pass. The latter originated in the 1980s, though has been revised extensively since, and is 
another piece of regulation created by the oil majors. The Pass, like the Passport, is required to enter 
refineries and terminals to collect fuel but it refers to the road tanker not its driver and is based on a 
six-monthly assessment of whether the former is in a safe condition. The Pass and the Passport were 
described to us as two sides of the same coin, standards to ensure safe distribution of fuel that 
target the vehicle and its driver respectively. 
Origins of the Passport 
The primary agent that gave rise to the Passport was Unite and the case, like the other instances of 
reregulation described above, attests to the continuing role of unions as forces for change within 
industrial relations. Oil distribution is a strategic industry and it was the prospect of the major 
economic disruption that would flow from a national strike that gave impetus to the Passport 
scheme. This was readily conceded by those ǁho ǁeƌe iŶteƌǀieǁed oŶ the eŵploǇeƌs͛ side: 
You͛ll ƌeĐall that the taŶkeƌ dƌiǀeƌs ǁeƌe thƌeateŶiŶg to go oŶ stƌike aŶd theƌe ǁas a lot of 
meetings with government around that, and one of the things that came out of that was 
that the unions wanted to develop a forum around safety and improved safety for tanker 
dƌiǀeƌs etĐ., aŶd that͛s ǁheƌe this Đaŵe fƌoŵ aŶd that ǁas the ďiƌth of the PDP ;Tƌade 
Association Representative). 
The Petroleum Driver Passport is not the only instance of Unite seeking to develop multi-
employer regulation of the labour market and the union has a strategy of recreating institutions of 
this kind. The developments in meat-processing, described above, provide another example. Also, at 
the same time as the Passport was developed Unite was running a campaign to establish multi-
employer collective bargaining across the 18 companies operating London buses. The union is also a 
strong supporter of the proposal for Sectoral Employment Commissions. In pursuing this 
reregulation objective what is notable is the uŶioŶ͛s reliance on relatively traditional methods. As we 
have seen, these were abandoned in meat-processing when they proved ineffective but in the case 
of the Passport and for London buses the union campaign relied upon strike action. There have been 
appeals foƌ puďliĐ suppoƌt aŶd a fƌaŵiŶg of the uŶioŶ͛s oďjeĐtiǀe as the puƌsuit of a puďliĐ good ďut, 
contrary to much of the union revitalization literature, the threat of withdrawal labour has been the 
main power resource that the union has deployed. 
 While Unite had primacy in the origins of the Passport, other actors also exercised significant 
agency. Once the dispute had broken the state played an important role in resolving the conflict and 
in guiding the parties towards the development of the Passport. Thus, ACAS provided collective 
conciliation and encouraged the creation of a joint working party to review safety and HSE advised 
that a voluntary code could prove more effective than statutory regulation. The Government was 
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also centrally involved, taking the initiative in reconstituting the DODF and encouraging the various 
stakeholders to cooperate in developing the Passport: 
[W]ithout them approaching, this would not have happened because we would not have 
been alerted to doing this and the industry and the otheƌ plaǇeƌs…MǇ phƌaseologǇ aŶd 
forgive me, is they do not come together unless someone herds the cats together. So we 
had our first meeting of the DODF in July of 2012. The then Secretary of State for DECC, 
which would be Ed Davey, came and did a sort of fiǀe ŵiŶutes, ͞ThaŶk Ǉou foƌ all ĐoŵiŶg 
togetheƌ. I͛ŵ ǁishiŶg Ǉou ǁell ǁith Ǉouƌ pƌojeĐt͟. “o I thiŶk GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt ǁeƌe the iŶitiatiŶg 
spark and they have been a champion and a supporter throughout the process (Officer of 
Industry Training Body). 
The Government also offered more tangible support in the form of pump-priming money to get the 
Passport up and running and by signing – via the DoT - the management contract with SQA (DODF 
did not have the legal capacity itself to act as signatory). 
 The primary stance adopted by Government towards the resolution of the dispute and the 
development of the Passport was both voluntarist and integrative. From the outset, it was made 
clear that a statutory code would not be countenanced but there was a commitment to supporting 
self-regulation of the industry through the participation of all stakeholders, including the unions. The 
preference for an integrative, multi-stakeholder solution to the dispute probably reflected the less-
hawkish perspective on industrial relations favoured by Liberal Democrat members of the Coalition 
Government, like Ed Davey (Williams et al. 2016). This perspective did not fully define the approach 
adopted by Government, however, and the most controversial feature of the Passport was the 
extension of the scheme to military drivers. From the outset, a programme was initiated to train a 
large force of military drivers in the safe practice of loading, driving and offloading fuel as part of the 
GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s ĐoŶtiŶgeŶĐǇ plaŶŶiŶg. “oŵe ǁho ǁeƌe iŶteƌǀieǁed, on both employer and union 
sides, saw this as an explicit attempt to create a replacement workforce in the event of a future 
threatened strike; a means of reducing the positional power of the trade unions. 
 The employers and other businesses within oil distribution also played an important part in 
developing the PDP scheme, including assuming the key responsibility for enforcement. Two 
features of the industry were important in supporting the participation of employers. The first is 
that, notwithstanding the emergence of extended and fragmented supply chains, oil distribution is 
highly organized. Like many mature industries, the industry boasts a rich institutional environment. 
All of the main segments of the industry are represented by trade associations with high levels of 
membership and the sector skills organizations, Cogent Skills and Skills for Logistics (the latter now 
defunct), provided an additional context for deliberation and common action. The support of oil 
companies, owners of oil terminals and smaller haulage contractors was secured through their trade 
associations, which sold the scheme to members and ensured their interests were incorporated 
within its design. Voluntary regulation at an industry scale therefore was conditional on the 
collective organization of industry participants; but it should be noted that this was collective 
organization through trade, not employer associations. UKPIA, TSA, FPS and other associations 
involved in the Passport scheme are not concerned primarily with employment issues and have no 
collective bargaining relationship with trade unions. 
 The second characteristic was the fact that oil distribution is a safety-critical industry. The 
products that are stored and transported are extremely hazardous and there is an extensive web of 
safety regulation that stems variously from the United Nations (ADR), the European Union (CPC), the 
UK Government and the industry itself (Safe Loading Pass). Paying regard to safety, complying with 
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regulations and establishing internal systems of safe-working are consequently integral to the 
operations of firms within the industry: for example, all haulage companies in oil distribution must 
by law appoint a Dangerous Goods Safety Advisor. Moreover, several respondents referred to the 
legacy of the Buncefield Disaster, a major explosion and fire at a storage terminal in Hertfordshire in 
2005. In this context, businesses and trade associations were receptive to further action on safe-
working and wanted to demonstrate their safety commitment to Government, employees and to the 
public at large. There were also tangible benefits to be obtained through the Passport scheme. For 
operators of oil terminals, for instance, it was a means of demonstrating to HSE that they were 
discharging their obligation to operate safely by only admitting safety-trained drivers on-site. 
Effects of the Passport 
Following its launch in January 2014 the Petroleum Driver Passport has diffused rapidly through the 
industry. By the autumn of 2015 more than 6,500 Passports had been issued, covering the majority 
of the eligible workforce. A manager from a major haulage company told us that his firm had put 
1000 drivers through the training programme to ensure they acquired the Passport, a major 
investment in training, and there had also been widespread take-up amongst smaller haulage 
businesses, represented by FPS. Cross-industry support and, crucially, the enforcement of the 
scheme at refineries and terminals has allowed the Passport to become rapidly established as part of 
the regulatory framework for the industry. 
 There was also evidence of the diffusion of the Passport. The scheme was initially launched 
in Great Britain but was then extended to Northern Ireland, a process that required the cooperation 
of the Irish authorities because of the open border and extensive cross-border trade in fuel. Other 
jurisdictions have also expressed interest in the Passport (e.g. Italy, Australia) and at the time of the 
research the possibility of franchising the scheme was being explored. In addition, the DODF was 
considering the development of a new regulation to improve safety at the retail end of the supply 
chain, on station forecourts, albeit with a different format and without the enforcement through a 
passport mechanism of the original scheme. 
 The main beneficial effect of the scheme, in the eyes of the logistics companies, was to 
standardize management practice, such that a common training regime and set of procedures were 
established for safe working in oil transport. An important feature of this new standardized practice 
was the spread of practical assessment of driver competence, something which was practised within 
leading firms but which was not previously universal. The scheme, it was suggested had eliminated 
egregious bad practice, found in a minority of businesses, and had established a benchmark below 
which future practice would not fall: 
[T]he ƌeasoŶ ǁe͛ǀe ďeeŶ a stƌoŶg adǀoĐate of this fƌoŵ the outset ďeĐause it is ǁhat ǁe 
should be doing and in most cases you ask any of the industry, what it has done is give a 
level playing field. So even for our sub-ĐoŶtƌaĐtoƌs it͛s a ǁaǇ foƌ us to eŶsuƌe that the guǇs 
that aƌe suďĐoŶtƌaĐted to us…it is a ǁaǇ foƌ us to eŶsuƌe that theƌe is tƌaiŶiŶg ďeiŶg giǀeŶ to 
those drivers aŶd fƌoŵ a Đost poiŶt of ǀieǁ, to eŶsuƌe that ǁhat I͛ŵ doiŶg should ďe the 
same for everybody else (Haulage Company Training Manager). 
An important consequence of this standardization was the levelling of the competitive playing 
ground, reducing the exposure to competition of leading firms from those with lower standards. 
 The other main outcome from the initiative was the re-establishing of DODF, a governance 
institution that brought together the main stakeholders within the industry, including the unions, 
who were represented both by senior national officers and by shop stewards drawn from the 
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unionized haulage companies. The DODF was described to us by all who were interviewed as an 
effective institution that operated through cooperative joint-working; although the language of 
͚paƌtŶeƌship͛ was avoided, it embodied the principle of social partnership: 
All paƌtiĐipated aŶd ǀeƌǇ ĐoŶstƌuĐtiǀelǇ. It ǁasŶ͛t a Đase of theǇ just seŶt a Đouple of ŵiŶioŶs 
along. It was dealt with very constructively and I must admit that Unite have been very, very 
helpful in driving the scheme forward (Haulage Company Safety Manager). 
Unite was especially positive about the DODF, feeling that it provided the union with due recognition 
of the constructive role it played in the industry and welcoming the opportunity it provided to play a 
part in the industƌǇ͛s goǀeƌŶaŶĐe.  Trade associations, representing relatively new entrants and 
smaller businesses, welcomed the forum in very similar terms. 
 While the DODF was a successful, industry-level institution, however, it also seemed to be a 
discrete initiative with limited repercussion beyond the question of driver safety. Employer 
representatives were adamant that the forum had no bargaining role and was distinct from existing 
industrial relations institutions through which pay and benefits were determined. They also 
underlined the determination of haulage companies to retain the locus of bargaining at company 
level: 
[W]e [DODF] are not a substitute or any way, shape or form, a board that would get 
ďetǁeeŶ a ĐoŵpaŶǇ aŶd a uŶioŶ. We͛ƌe Ŷot theƌe to help uŶioŶ ŶegotiatioŶs. We aƌe 
focusing on the one aspect of road safety (Trade Association Representative). 
There seemed little chance, at the time of the research, of the DODF leading to a more general 
centralization of industrial relations within oil distribution. It was a step towards reregulation at the 
multi-employer level but one that was confined to a particular issue and which had only limited 
implications for the broader structure of industrial relations within the sector. 
Conclusion 
The Petroleum Driver Passport shares some of the features identified in other cases of reregulation. 
Thus, the scheme originated in concern amongst employees that a more fragmented and 
deregulated labour market was eroding conditions of employment, exerting a downward pressure 
on pay and threatening safety. The changed conditions in the industry were also creating a new 
requirement for portable benefits. In addition, pressure for action originated in the trade union 
movement and resulted in a form of voluntary regulation that encompassed multiple employers.  
Despite the voluntarism of the scheme, however, Government and state agencies played an 
important part in bringing the Passport into being, and at the heart of the scheme was a new 
industry-level institution, the DODF, which created the Passport and assumed responsibility for its 
implementation. Finally, the Passport was promoted as a public good, affording protection to the 
iŶdustƌǇ͛s ǁoƌkfoƌĐe ďut also to the wider public at risk from the unsafe transport of hazardous fuel. 
 Although the Passport shared features with other cases, it was also distinctive in certain 
respects. Road tanker drivers are a relatively well-paid and well-organized group, with a 
demographic profile at odds with that of the women, migrant and minority workers at the heart of 
other cases. Arguably, the Passport case points to the insecurities attendant on deregulation 
spreading through the workforce to encompass those in hitherto relatively fortunate positions. The 
strong trade union tradition of the industry explains another distinctive feature of the Passport case: 
the scheme arose from threatened strike action and the union campaign was not characterized by 
the building of alliances with users or human rights campaigners in the manner of other cases or as 
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is proposed in some of the prescriptive literature on union revitalization (e.g. Alberti 2016). The 
Passport was the product of an established, not a new trade unionism. The DODF is a novel 
institution, however, and unlike other cases, where reregulation occurred through collective 
bargaining, the Passport was the product of a multi-stakeholder institution acting through 
consensual decision-making. The method of enforcement in the scheme was also distinctive. It relied 
upon the issuing of a Passport to tanker drivers, a measure akin to a license to practice, which was 
enforced through the positional power of terminal operators who controlled the flow of product 
into the supply chain rather than the monopsonistic power of brands at its apex. These distinctive 
features indicate that reregulation can follow a number of routes and assume a variety of forms. 
 The Petroleum Driver Passport scheme is an example of the successful reregulation of the 
labour market and for this reason holds possible lessons for reform in other industries. Arguably 
there are four lessons of this kind. First, the scheme was the product of industrial conflict and attests 
to the value of conflict in bringing issues forward for resolution. The union campaign and threat of 
disruption was the essential precondition which compelled other actors to take seriously the 
question of a new code to regulate driver safety. Second, the state played an important role in 
facilitating the emergence of the scheme and in guiding the parties towards a voluntarist solution, a 
role that government has historically played within UK industrial relations (Howell 2005). 
Reregulation even of a voluntary kind, the case suggests, may require support from public actors. 
Third, another important facilitating condition was the collective organization of employers in the 
iŶdustƌǇ, ǁhiĐh pƌoǀided a ĐhaŶŶel thƌough ǁhiĐh ďusiŶesses Đould paƌtiĐipate iŶ the sĐheŵe͛s 
development and implementation. Reregulation at an industry-level, the case indicates requires 
employers to be organized at this level. Finally, the Passport served the purpose of multiple interests 
within the industry, giving all parties a stake in its success. The union secured its objectives of 
pƌoŵotiŶg dƌiǀeƌ safetǇ aŶd ĐeŵeŶtiŶg its plaĐe iŶ the iŶdustƌǇ͛s goǀeƌŶaŶĐe, the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt 
secured a scheme that complied with its stance on avoiding statutory regulation, and employers 
obtained a common safety standard that demonstrated their commitment to safe-working at a cost 
that was acceptable thanks to the integration of the scheme with other, existing bodies of 
regulation. Union pressure, state support, employer organization and positive value to relevant 
stakeholders emerge from the case as the conditions of reregulation. 
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Table 1 Interview programme 
Organisation 
 
Number of 
interviewees 
 
Unite the Union 3 
Trades Union Congress 1 
Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) 2 
Logistics companies/hauliers 2 
Downstream Oil-industry Distribution Forum (DODF) 2 
Cogent Skills 1 
United Kingdom Petroleum Industry Association (UKPIA) 1 
Tank Storage Association (TSA) 1 
Federation of Petroleum Suppliers 1 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) 1 
Total 15 
NB Interviews were sought but not obtained from the United Road Transport Union, the other trade 
union operating in oil-distribution, and from the Scottish Qualifications Authority, which plays a role 
in administering the Passport scheme. 
